This article explores some theological points of contact and development arising from an understanding of the city not yet receiving sustained attention in urban theologies -crime and punishment. It gives an account of the expressive criminality of late modern cities and the attendant sociology of vindictiveness that shapes practices of punishment. It demurs from an influential but highly pessimistic vision of the persistence of consumerist desire, the only escape from which comes in a largely unsustainable politics of renunciation (Steve Hall drawing on Slavoj Žižek). It begins to develop an account of non-consumerist desire and political subjectivity though a critical dialogue with Žižek's exposition of Romans 7. It suggest that the fragmentary urban practices of Christian mercy (offender reintegration, education programmes, anti-gang social projects, youth work) enact a form of asceticism which more satisfactorily parallels the covenantal and participatory thrust of Romans 5-8.
thereby denies them the self-realisation they have been promised in a putatively meritocratic (but in fact highly privileged and stratified) social order.
The picture of social anomie arising from frustrated ambitions owes a great deal to Robert Merton's diagnosis of recourse to crime as an 'adjustment' or 'adaptation' responding to the lack of legitimate avenues for the attainment of the American Dream 4 or European equivalents in late modern consumer capitalist societies. Cultural criminology adds recognition of the energy and eroticism of transgression; crime is not merely rationally chosen as the most viable option for attainment; it is a carnival 5 and a seduction 6 .
Transgressive desire is tied to the conditions of late modern consumerism, and is actualised in ways riven with class sensibilities and sub-cultural signification. Mike Presdee discusses dog-fighting, cock-fighting, bare-knuckle fighting, street racing, and the voyeuristic consumption of 'real' humiliations, crimes, and violence of reality television. These are the seductions that "run along the edge of 'shame'." 7 Thus fuelling an increasing penal vindictiveness that is often inflected with terms vilifying an urban precariat or 'chav' underclass. 8 "The never-ending process of commodification under contemporary capitalism dovetails neatly with the increasing need for privately enjoyed, carnivalesque transgression.
As the 'official' world of politics, rationality and science tracks down transgression, so the 'second life' of the people erupts as private pleasures." 9 These four elements: the expressive and erotic carnival of transgression; Mertonian calculations; the 'othering' of the offender; and a culture of penal vindictiveness; all flow from a pervasive ontological insecurity driven by the assemblage of desire in the late modern consumer city. As Keith Hayward notes, the expressivity of crime, perhaps especially of violence, is "both a product and a reflection of 'hegemonic masculinity'…In this sense, the desire to 'exert control' becomes even more urgent when set against the backdrop of the post-industrial working-class urban landscape." 10 The 'delight of being deviant' is not merely a seduction into the sublime but ephemeral 'rebel self,' but also a desperate grasping at the crumbling sands of previously stable and controlled identity. "In a powerless world, crime creates power for the individual to express their individuality. …This is the art in crime rather than the art of crime and in turn creates crime's seductive nature." 11 Stephen Lyng persuasively argues (when applied to male urban criminality at least) that a wide variety of such transgressive and risk-laden crimes constitute but the criminal end of a variety of spectacular expressive and exhilarating 'edgework,' from base-jumping to tagging, whereby 'the individual's failure to meet the challenge at hand will result in death, or at the very least, debilitating injury.' 12 Thus edgework is a means of asserting control, "the ability to maintain control over a situation that verges on complete chaos" and thus rail against "the unidentifiable forces that rob one of individual choice." 13 It is, paradoxically, predicated on precisely the modernist myths of control, choice and individual entitlement which have generated the pervasive sense of banality against which it erupts. Whereas Lyng's work is aimed at a generic description of risk taking, and largely focuses on discrete, demarcated and even bespoke risk-taking spaces; Hayward rightly argues that, in the case of urban criminal edgework "the run-down estate or ghetto neighbourhood becomes a paradoxical space: on one hand, it symbolizes the systematic powerlessness as often felt by the individuals who live in these environments; and on the other, the sink estate serves as a site of risk consumption that provides numerous illegal avenues. The ghetto becomes a 'performance zone' in which displays of risk, excitement, masculinity and even 'carnivalesque pleasure' in the form of rioting …are frequently perpetuated." materialism) but are the pinnacle of a rapacious, unforgiving and aggressive materialsemiotics.
The ubiquity of this sensuality and desire generates a kind of anxiety which Young describes as 'vertigo.'
Vertigo is the malaise of late modernity: a sense of insecurity of insubstantiality, and of uncertainty, a whiff of chaos and a fear of falling. The signs of giddniess, of unsteadiness, are everywhere, some serious, many minor; yet once acknowledged, a series of separate seemingly disparate facts begin to fall into place. The obsession with rules, an insistence on clear uncompromising lines of demarcation between correct and incorrect behaviour, a narrowing of borders, a decreased tolerance of deviance, a disproportionate response to rule-breaking, an easy resort to punitiveness and a point at which simple punishment begins to verge on the vindictive. 18 This vindictiveness is the result of an attempt to 'create a secure base' in the face of pervasive ontological insecurity.
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It is easy to see how the ontological insecurity of perpetual self-creation, combined with the commodification of complex cultures as brands and lifestyle choices constrains secular and religious political engagement in such contexts. 20 The widespread diagnosis of a dissolution of the social, and in particular, of the impossibility of genuine political action, is manifest in post-industrial urban working-class neighbourhoods. Here "the majority of formal citizens are no longer actively involved in creating social meaning and institutions, only ephemeral lifestyles in a process of narcissistic identification" 21 The subject, as Lacan argued, is captured by the consumer environment and a basic infantile narcissism is retained throughout the life-course. As a result "adulthood is now a continuation of the narcissistic aspects of the infantile world, and as this simulated faux-adulthood is imposed on the child from an early age, we are seeing the end of both traditional childhood and adulthood: distinct however, in line with the eschewal of normativity in contemporary criminology, is a clear account of the possibility of resistance and change, the first step in which, I shall suggest, must be an account of the education and formation of desire, asceticism.
Like Katz, discussions of desire and affect in cultural criminology, and also in much urban theory, 27 centres around a rather static, naturalist and irrationalist account of desire and affect. This exaggerates the separation of transgressive thrills from instrumental reason, and underplays the extent to which emotions and drives to transgression are contingent upon the machine of savage capitalism, i.e. the particular constellation of desire-producing and shaping apparatus of contemporary consumer capitalism. The infantilized consumer is then a product of postwar marketing strategies which seek to garner extended access to the high phase of disposable income through the deliberate extension of adolescent desire from 12 to 23 Hall shortcomings of this analysis, we will be better placed to sketch the lineaments of a more radical and more orthodox theology of urban crime and consumerism. There is a radical decisionism to Žižek's vision of unplugging. We shall later return to the question of the sustainability of an unplugged existence. For now we must note that mere disdain or 'critical distance' from consumerism are insufficient for the radically of the breach required. Indeed, the stance of cynic is, for Žižek, the default mode of consumerist subjectivity, which thereby only intensifies the solipsistic refusal of the Other at the heart of the late modern symbolic order. The 'neighbour' is the genuinely threatening other who takes their consumption too seriously. The rioter looting to obtain goods of consumer signification may be all too easily dismissed in the mock ridicule -why would 'they' be so foolish as to risk imprisonment for something so meaningless as a phone or trainers? Thus middle-class cynical consumerism adopts a stance of one immune to the pressures of social signification, thereby labelling of the underclass as libidinally ill-disciplined and foolish. In failing to recognise the symbolic power of consumer goods to any subculture, a cynical subject exemplifies the view that the enemy of late modern civility is the 'fanatic' who fails to display 'a proper distance towards the dispersed plurality of subject-positions."
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For Žižek, drawing extensively on Jacques Lacan, in tones redolent of baptismal theology, the genuinely political act is a traumatic experience of radical 'subjective destitution', a symbolic death. 44 Only a radical 'feminine' act of this kind can enact the kind of hysteric 'insanity' that denies the range of choices, including the branded range of rebel options proffered in the symbolic order of law and obscene supplement. 45 Unlike the clinical hysteric, however, this ethical act is not staged for the benefit of the watching Other. Thus, for Žižek, any authentic political act is structured paradoxically: "[a]n act accomplishes what, within the given symbolic universe, appears to be 'impossible', yet it changes its conditions so that it creates retroactively the conditions of its own possibility." 46 we can be sure that this statement conceals a qualification "…except your very soul." 71 Žižek construes the contrast in relation to notions of grace and redemption which more than flirt Žižek only substantive reference to the public ministry of Christ is to identify the invocations in the Sermon on the Mount as exemplars of the breach that enables radical subjectivity. To turn the other cheek, to go the extra mile, or to give both coat and cloak, are precisely the kind of over-identification with law that unplugs. 77 Unplugging here is achieved through the exposure of the arbitrary and unjust use of law -the libido dominandi concealed beneath the fantasy of honour and shame, pax romana, or valid private debt. As with both the proletarian in Marx, and we might add, the bulimic subject of Young, Christ is thus included and excluded simultaneously, or better, he is the one included as excluded -as homo sacer 78 or as the 'excremental remainder.' 79 In one of the only instances where Žižek's reflection on law and transgression focuses explicitly on crime, this leads him to say that the dialectical 'negation of negation' is the realisation that law is 'a subspecies of crime, crime's selfrelating negation (just as property is theft's self-relating negation." 80 Combining this with his account of the dialectical nature of Christ's non-perverse sublation of the law, he then claims that what happens is not, per the standard progressivist reading of Hegel, the emergence of a new synthesis which obliterates both constituents, but the narration of a second story which 'brings home the antagonism, the gap that separates the two stories, and this antagonism is the 'truth' of the entire field." 81 Thus the Bartlebean moment requires an absolute separation of law and love (agape). "Once we become fully aware of the dimension of love in its radical difference from the Law, love has, in a way, already won, since this difference is visible only when one already dwells in love." 82 The announcement of this second story is, we might say, Christ's "you have heard it said …. But I say to you."
There is much of promise here, but it is compromised by the erection of one of Žižek's characteristic dichotomies. So, Christ's teaching wherein the sinful deed of adultery is radicalised into the prohibition of lustful gaze may be read either as enjoining a perverse discipline of desire or as the hysteric breaking the vicious cycle of desire and prohibition. 83 In the latter scenario the New Testament is read supercessionistically as the 'second text' which displaces the law of the Old Testament. 84 Thus Žižek runs together the possibility of genuine unplugging with the necessity of a vanishing mediator and a critique of asceticism, the education of desire. There is something of a distaste for the ambiguous and quotidian practices in which a life outside of the consumerist machine would be led. In turning in later works away from the 'ethics of desire' to the ethics of 'drive' Žižek takes aim at teleological accounts of the formation of virtue, the acquisition of a second higher nature, in Aristotelian terms. For Žižek's ethics there can be no education of desire that escapes perverse subjectivity. Only the ethics of the drive, with the radical Lacanian Act, may do this. In the logic of desire one seeks but never finds the true 'it' the object of desire which fulfils, which heals the lack or void at the heart of subjectivity -in Augustinian terms, the heart will remain perpetually restless. In the move to the ethics of the drive one finds not a frustration at the eternal quest for the lost object (objet a) of the nomadic libidinal heart, but rather an embrace of the ineradicable void, the negative surd of a perpetual circularity, a delight and quest not in or for a fugitive lost object, but in the unceasing and inescapable presence of lostness itself. 85 Thus, while capitalist consumerism exploits desire, it does so most fundamentally not with the promise of satisfaction (the logic of desire), but through drive, "understood as the impersonal compulsion to engage in the endless circular movement of expanded self-reproduction." 86 This is sustained all the more vociferously with the selfreferential deprecation of the consumer-cynic; the whimsical 'I am a shopping addict.'
Likewise, the transgressive glorification of urban criminal edgework is not subject to the ethics of desire; it is not just a quest for the lost object, but a celebration of apparently excessive or pointless risk, a hyper-macho variant of the shift from desire to drive -"a push to directly enact the 'loss'-the gap, cut, distance -itself." 87 Thus it is not at all clear how Žižek's embrace of drive can issue in the kind of radical political act that genuinely escapes consumerism.
Moreover, the absolute separation of the love of desire (eros) from the radical self-restituting love of drive (agape) so famously bifurcated by Anders Nygren, is here combined with an appeal for a thoroughly politicised Kierkegaardian leap ("what we need today is a theologicopolitical suspension of the ethical," 88 such that "Eros cannot truly overcome Law, it can only explode in punctual intensity, as the Law's momentary transgression … agape is what 84 Žižek, "Fear of Four Words," pp.67-8. 85 Žižek, Less Than Nothing, p.63. 86 Žižek, Parallax View, p.61. 87 Žižek, Less Than Nothing, p.63. 95 There is no bifurcation between justification and participation. The sanctifying work of the Holy Spirit in Rom. 8 is thus an incorporation into redeemed humanity by way of an ascetic reeducation of desire, an inauguration of a Christic libidinal economy.
To love the world in God is to participate in God's love for that world, to love and to desire as God loves and desires. 96 The Kantian and pseudo-Lutheran dichotomisation of law and love means that, for Žižek as much as for the ever-vigilant evangelical defenders against semipelagianism and works righteousness, quotidian acts of mercy, construed within a synergistic messianic sanctification cannot be thought. 97 That is to say, this dichotomisation don't spend, economise; retain instead of letting go -all the proverbial 'anal' qualities. And it is only this desire, the very anti-desire, that is here desire par excellence. … … Thus the very sticking to the rule of moderation, the very avoidance of excess, generates an excess -a surplus enjoyment -of its own." 102 This is a renunciation that leaves the consumer-subject entirely in tact. The theological question is whether asceticism, the deliberate and sustained discipline of desire, really is opposed to genuine political acts; can it ever be the means by which a pneumatically empowered sanctification 'unplugs' one from the symbolic order?
Asceticism as Political Act
Can there then be an asceticism which is neither perverse nor a rhetorical radicalism stalled at the moment of rupture? The privative logic of miserliness is the perverse form of renunciation, the fetishisation of surplus value. What is absent in the programme of the miser's heavy-locked vault, is precisely the use of the 'property.' It is to be contrasted with the ascetic and monastic accounts of use in which both property and human desire are disposed toward the common good. 103 Thus, if we adopt a broader and more original definition of asceticism (askhsiv askēsis) as the formation and disciplining of desire, as selfformation not self-negation (which it becomes under the devaluations of the material world in the theurgic techniques of neo-platonism and gnosticism), then the term retains currency.
One might object that this broader definition of asceticism flirts with vacuity. 104 Here the return of teleology is essential. The way toward this is, I suggest, opened up precisely by reading Rom. 7 in the light of the covenantal and messianic thrust of the full literary unit of Rom. 5-8. In the short space that remains, I can merely give brief indications of how a reading of Rom. 5-8 as invoking a messianic asceticism may address the vertiginous complexion of urban crime and penal vindictiveness.
The connection between asceticism and works of mercy is found in the pattern of active union with Christ; baptismal union issues in a participation in the descent of God in Christ to the outcast, to unjust death, and thus in his ascent to the Father. For Gregory of Nazianzus
Christian asceticism awaits gracious completion, without which it cannot become true filanqropia (philanthropia), the redeeming good work of God. This ascetic ascent is the sacramental and soteriological experience of theosis, which Gregory explicitly associates with the notion of becoming not divine, but heirs with Christ (Rom. 8:12-17). 105 Notably
Nazianzen does not give a programmatic stipulation of ascetic practices, but instead indicates how the showing of mercy is an ineradicable demand of the transformation of the flesh. 106 Filanqropia, unlike modern philanthropy, is anything but patrician condescension.
Thus the form of asceticism which may unplug its subjects from the libidinal economy of consumerism must not merely exercise self-discipline and temporary restraint. As with Take perhaps the most commonly criticised element of a body-denying Christian asceticism, celibacy. Amongst the messy history of this complex set of practices we find early forms of celibacy in which the focus is not on a perverse rejection of sexual desire, but a repudiation of the exploitative and dehumanising structures of reproductive servitude. 108 Celibates breached the pervasive system of patriarchal social signification, displacing the tying of honour and shame, glory and humiliation to the production of sons and heirs. Celibate fraternity was thus the provocative ascetic liturgy of unplugging, based precisely in Christic participation in the gloriously dishonourable adoption as children of God. Of course, these accounts of celibacy and mysticism still drip with eroticism; not because desire is prohibited, but because it is redirected and, in the suggestive notion of Gregory of Nyssa, it is intensified, 109 not in its lack but in its satiety.
There is an inherent fragility to unplugged acts; perversity is always a danger. What is notable in Rom. 8 is that hope is not structured as a fiduciary exchange, there is no promissory note issued to the faithful, and nor, despite the use of sporting images for sanctification, does Paul regard this process as one characterised by linear development in an incremental trajectory. In being unplugged from the cycle of law and inherent transgression, the believer is not transported beyond suffering (Rom. Žižek defends as prefiguring the communist collectivity, or the Christian community of outcasts. 110 When Žižek reaches for an instantiation of a community of solidarity with the 'non-all,' it is notable that he points to slum dwellers. 111 Even here though, the solidaristic rhetoric lacks the structures and practices by which sustained action may emerge.
In relation to our focus on penal vindictiveness and urban crime, the ecclesial practices of prison visiting (whether for comfort and companionship, education or worship), offender reintegration and mentoring, 112 youth work in deprived areas, anti-gang projects, and the like, may enact the fragile collective asceticism in which divine filanqropia is made present.
These mundane practices counter the perverse positing of the figure of a criminal other deserving of severe punishment. The mutual exposure of vulnerabilities, and the pro-active offer of trust to ex-offenders found in faith-based prisoner reintegration programmes serves as a clear example of the practices by which the self-enclosing operation of consumerist desire are undone. Notably, the offer of trust without or prior to evidence of trustworthiness runs entirely counter to state-provided training in offender reintegration, which is strongly dominated by risk management and a tendency to regard offenders as inherently undeserving of trust. 113 Such enterprises are the kind of messianic ascetic acts which rupture the libidinal economy of neoliberalism in which coalesce consumer desire, penal vindictiveness and positivist risk management. 114 They offer integration into a social body not structured around the incessant pressure of self-creation and consumer signification. They are ascetic precisely in that they may form an integral part of the narrative of criminal desistance in which the formation of character and virtue are central. 115 This is not to say, of course, that the church is immune from its own perverse consumerist logic. 116 Without an explicit and sustained repudiation of consumerism, the urban presence of the churches would remain perverse, and their role in reintegration of ex-offenders would return the participants only to an asceticism of delayed gratification and an ingrafting into more 'respectable' and cynical modes of consumption and social signification. Nonetheless, the Christian community, even in often fragile urban presence, remains one of the only alternative sites of belonging to desiccated sociality of urban marginality or the Hobbesian contract of gangs.
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In contrast to the notable absence of the schema of ascension in Žižek's reading of Romans, it is in raising to the right hand of God the one who had been rendered an 'excremental remainder' that the vertiginous symbolic order is ruptured. The cry of dereliction from the cross evokes not the passing away of the big Other, but the covenantal fidelity of a God whose own subjective destitution ruptures the flow of stumbling idolatrous perversity and invites participation in a renewed subjectivity. 118 The acts of mercy in which are found a sustained messianic asceticism, expose and fracture the libidinal economy in which drive remains cycling, desire remains nomadic, the Neighbour continues to be figured as enemy, and the discourse of honour and shame in consumer signification press urban subjects into crime, anomie and anxiety. Genuine political hope against consumerist vertigo, crime and penal vindictiveness is grounded in a range of ascetic disciplines sustained by a community whose master took the form of a slave. Only the education of desire away from the unbearable pressure of fearful lack and grasping agonism can form the basis for the apocalyptic inversion found in St Paul's most surprising claim in his correspondence with the 'no-marks' and 'Aldi-bashers' of Corinth -"Everything belongs to you." All the narrowing of brand-loyalties, the self-constructions of factionalism and fear are subordinated to the apocalyptic Lordship of Christ -"whether Paul or Apollos or Cephas or the world or life or death or the present or the future -all are yours, and you are of Christ, and Christ is of
